Wampum

via the NYTimes [link]. Comments intraliniar in italics.

SUBJECT: Iraq -- Illustrative New Courses of Action

The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options:

If that is the SecDef's view, than replacement of the commanding officer(s) in the CENTCOM AOR should be on this memo, unless the operational planning for US forces in Iraq are made in the Pentagon, in which case the candidates for replacement are a lot closer.

ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS

Above the Line: (Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others)

• Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. -- political, economic and security goals -- to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made). As Cole remarks, this is just spin, which is not War Department business.

• Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq. Dump advisors and hardware on the "Iraqi Army" and abandon al-Anbar to defend Baghdad. I think I've heard that somewhere else.

• Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units' language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops. Hire translaters hasn't worked, so use Shi'i militia infiltrators into the "Iraqi Army", for operations against the Nationalist Army and the Sunni population targeted by the Shi'i militias. More guys like Ahmed al-Ghamdi should be inside the mess tent, not less. (Score: 22 US KIA)

• Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF -- the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. -- by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.) Retirees and volunteers are going to infill jobs in the party spoils system of Ministry allocation, and (a) live to tell about it, and (b) be effective while not speaking Arabic.

• Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007. Cantonize. The sure sign of a defeat by attacks on the logistical tail.

• Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF. The Murtha (and Cole) proposals. Combat air and armor, plus their protection forces, to conduct operations against a sea of car jackers armed with light infantry weapons. Expensive and futile.

• Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province. This is actually rational. Had this been followed earlier, quite a bit of force-on-force cost could have been avoided. Of course, this would also have placed the (original) Iraq Army, and the Iranian carpet bagger militias, and the domestic militias, in exclusive control of disjoint areas, and weakened the fiction of government by puppets.

• Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, 'If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it." No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence. Today's news is that Qutar is going to pay the saleries of the Palestinians working in education and health. Tomorrow's is that someone is going to replace the US rebuilding any part of Iraq were Halliburton isn't welcome.

• Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government. Retreat by another name, back to the pre-invasion perimeters.

• Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions -- cities, patrolling, etc. -- and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance. The Murtha (and Cole) proposals, again. Combat air and armor, plus their protection forces, to conduct operations against a sea of car jackers armed with light infantry weapons. Expensive and futile.

• Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start 'taking our hand off the bicycle seat"), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country. Almost rational, but which combat operations are suspended? Those that protect the Iranian carpet baggers and their militias? What is the liquidation order of the factions of the regime of puppets?

• Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period. Juan is critical of this. I'm not. If doing what Saddam did is more effective than doing something else, then maybe cancelling the lynching spectacle and funding Saddam to do what he was better at than the SecDef is a better policy choice than a lynching and a lot of guys with Kalashnikovs and plastique.

• Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it. Socialism? Having created the post-Ba'ath spoils system, it would have to be very pervasive to avoid being captured by major parties to the spoils system, and when captured, the losers would be back to ... Kalashnikovs and plastique.

• Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not "lose." No firm committments. In a war zone. Towards "allies" or "enemies". Not the best idea of the memo,

• Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) -- go minimalist. spin
  

• Continue on the current path. Ho ho ho.

• Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it. In progress.

• Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially. Kill John McCain's claims to expertise before he wins '08 pre-primary race.

• Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. Tell Iran and Syria to stay out. Good. A candidate date would be useful. "Now" or on the next Administration's watch.

• Assist in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan, moving towards three separate states -- Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. Make Joe Biden look like an idiot too, before the primary season gets hot (actually cold).

• Try a Dayton-like process. Try, not Commit To. More spin.