updates: 343rd Quartermaster Company Arrested
[more updates]
17 or 19 soldiers have been read their rights under the UCMJ and have been taken into custody. I'll update this as news comes in. It appears that they disobeyed an illegal order, to conduct routine logistics ops but delivering fuel known to be water contaminated to combat units (sabotage) and doing so without combat support and draw casualties (standing orders on force protection).
The unit was tasked to traverse Main Supply Route Tampa in unarmoured fuel transports with a top speed of 40 mph without gun-truck or rotary-wing escort. Separately, the fuel load is reported to have been water-contaminated and rejected by a combat unit seeking fuel resupply the previous day.
Army Times coverage gives the Oct 15th story above-the-e-fold currently.
AP coverage includes a message from Specialist Amber McClenny, received early Thursday morning by her mother that the unit had been detained and was under armed guard.
"This is a real, real, big emergency," McClenny said in her message. "I need you to contact someone. I mean, raise pure hell. We had broken down trucks, non-armoured vehicles and, um, we were carrying contaminated fuel. They are holding us against our will. We are now prisoners."
Recommended additional reading -- Stephanie Heinatz' series on MSR Tampa in the Hampton Roads Daily Press:
- 11 Oct. lessons-learned.
- 9 Oct. an MSR Tampa run.
- 8 Oct. Traffic jam, Baghdad segment of MSR Tampa.
- 5 Oct. an MSR Tampa run.
- 26 Sept. Gun trucks (.50 cal mounted Hummer).
- 26 Sept. Armoring the logistcs tail (note the Hummer suspension is insufficent to carry 1,000 pounds of armor plate. This is probably something you didn't want to know, that the Hummer is really ... unsafe at any speed).
- 22 Sept. a travelog (softnews).
- 21 Sept. :Trucker's Heaven. She's got one important quote:
"Yet it's still the place they bring all the broken-down equipment," Davidson said. "Scania is too small to house it and no one will drive a broken vehicle to Anaconda because it's north of Baghdad."
Emphasis added. The squad from the 343rd was ordered to take deadlined M-19 trucks and deadlined tankers north of Baghdad.
Grr. Neither Cole nor Black are going to do more than a de minimus. Not their soccer balls.
Update: Cole write-up captures the three elements. Good. Ties to KE04 critique of BC04 too. Also Good.
Update: Stars and Strips reports the squad members are no longer under guard, but are still confined to base. The back-off from charged-with-mutiney seems to have begun. The Merc has the "just released" story also.
Update: The contaminant was diesel, not water, and the fuel was for helicopters. Members of the squad are being demoted and reassigned. I still don't know the details of the rejection of the same load, the prior tasking for the squad. The base tasked and refused (unsafe order, unsafe fuel) was Taji, 27 klicks from central Baghdad. The 5,000 foot runway is visible in the photo. I selected this one to best convay the problem -- a convoy of gas trucks, without escort, personal arms only, with a top speed of 40 mph, in a cell phone rich environment, taking over an hour to transit a metro area to a well-known destination. It isn't the first 450 klicks, though there is some danger there. It is the last 45 klicks, which are profoundly dangerous.
Update: Mary Jacoby's write up from Salon.
Update: The CSM has an interesting piece. There is a blind quote from a 343rd member, paraphrased as: ... the soldiers' training had focused on skills such as testing fuel for contamination and running water-purification systems, rather than combat tasks ... , and a this:
Brig. Gen. James Chambers, COSCOM commander, said the investigation would last 10 to 14 days. He denied assertions reported by families of 343rd soldiers that the convoy in question carried contaminated fuel ...
Chambers went on to unhelpfully confuse body armor with vehicular armor, and weapons familiarization for gun truck and helo escort. Neither is a good sign in a CO.
Update: Greeting .mil readers. In no particular order, and just to bust caches, an update.
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Welcome all.
Update: The Seattle PI has a balenced OpEd piece. It misses the fuel contamination question, but otherwise is the best thus far link.
Update (19Oct am EST):
Banerjee and Kifner write an important piece in the NYTimes: Reservists Who Refused Order Tried to Persuade Superiors. This piece is being picked up broadly.
Andy Martin's note appeared briefly yesterday at mediamonitors.net, however the site appears to be down and google caches the spash page, not the article. The original is here The title of Martin's note is "Mississippi Mutiny" is IED aimed at President Bush. I've saved it, and if it vanishes too, I'll post it in the extended entry.
I've put the advice of a career Army officer, who I grew up with, at 001281. In a nutshell it is refuse the easy disciplinary offer and go for the CM. The odds-on outcomes look better for that route, and a career is a terrible thing to waste covering up felony-stupid and illegal orders for a Command that has an overhang problem.
Welcome soc.mil, bragg.army.mil, amedd.army.mil (Walter Reed), grafenwoehr.army.mil, afspc.af.mil (space and missile command), dfas.mil (defense finance and accounting service), irwin.army.mil (ntc), nga.mil (national geospatial-intelligence agency), areur.army.mil, msl.army.mil (redstone again) and peacecorps.gov (joining regular readers opm.gov, house.gov, nih.gov, nasa.gov, usdoj.gov, irs.gov, jccbi.gov, noaa.gov, dhs.gov, epa.gov, sec.gov, llnl.gov, uscourts.gov, usda.gov, lanl.gov and several states.gov).
Update (20Oct am EST):
Welcome mlrnoc.navy.mil (mid-atlantic regional network operations center), sill.army.mil and usma.army.mil, afit.af.mil (wright-patterson), randalph.af.mil.
CENTCOM announces that an officer in the 343rd's COC has been relieved of duty. Not good, but better than the alternative thus far.
Update (21Oct am EST):
Welcome dtra.mil (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, some WMD folks attached to DSC Philly).
Writing for the Clarion Ledger (Jackson, Mississipi), Jeremy Hudson reports that the identity of the officer who gave the refused order, and who then ordered the arrest of the 17 or 18 or 19 soldiers is Capt. Nancy Daniels of Birmingham. Jeremy gets some rather telling quotes from the families of the soldiers.
Lt. Col. Steven Boylan, director of the Combined Press Information Center in Baghdad went on record that the fuel load in question was not contaminated. Boylan is spinning the issue as confusion between fuel grades (JP8 and DF2), which doesn't jibe with the eye witness accounts of failure to purge tanks between changes of fuel loads, or the same-load-refused-as-contaminated statements. The basis for his expertise in the subject matter area has not been disclosed.
Boylan also went on record that a criminal investigation has begun, and that the scope of that investigation will not include anyone in the chain of command. The basis for a pre-determined investigative scope has not been disclosed.
Col. Darrell Roll, deputy commander of the 13th Corps Support Command will conduct an AR 15-6, (informal command investigation). The AR 15-6 will gather interviews and collect evidence on the conduct of the men and women, not on the fuel question, and not on the deadlined vehicle question, that is, those questions that go to the possibility of a command problem.
The Army TImes is running a "tell us what you think" exploitation in their on-line comments. The general tenor is "fire, aim, ready". The reporting at Stars and Stripes is at about the level. Of course, neither journal really can write about command errors or logistical snafus dispassionately, so the tenor is morality and obedience and regulars-vs-reservists testosterone metrics.
Belated welcome (I had to invert my logfile and do the lookups, listed in network address oreder) to:
DOE-Oak Ridge Operations, National Institutes of Health, Army Information Systems Command (Fort Lee, VA), DoD Network Information Center (Vienna, VA), U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms, US Federal Highway Administration (Washington, DC), General Motors Corporation, and about 110 others, many of whom use technically-challenged-by-DNS ISPs, and companies who, um, are in the same boat.
It is sobering to see the range of personal interest in the men and women of the 343rd, people coming in from work as well as from home, as well as the range of institutional interests that need to track a blog in Maine.
Update (25 Oct):
Welcome 20 CONS/CC (shaw.af.mil), s-tnosc.army.mil ("S" Theater Network Operations and Security Center, Ft. Gordon -- you guys must be bored to be reading blogs, say "hi" to Steve Winterfield) and house, state, and usda dot gov.
Comments
I am a retired Gulf War Vet and I think this is the biggest crime a soldier can commit mutiny.
I think the Army is growing to Soft with these
reservist they all know that when they join they can be sent in harms way.This is part of being a soldier and they are soldiers first then support
troops second.During the first Gulf War of my companies trucks/hmmve only 2 were armoured and they belonged to the commander and first seargent.I would like to think that the Army has not become a bunch of liberal yellow cowards and that they can still do the job they were trained to do.
Lewis
Hell on Wheels 2/66 Armoured Batalion
Posted by: Lewis | October 18, 2004 02:22 PM
Everyone gets an opinion.
I'm rather partial to the idea that ordering contaiminated fuel to be delivered to a combat support helo unit gets a citation.
Posted by: Eric | October 18, 2004 04:13 PM
I hope they burn their asses and take away their cell phones. Cowards! "Whaa. I don't want to go to combat, I'm gonna call my nanny."
Posted by: Bill Hedricki | October 18, 2004 06:16 PM
Your hope is pretty unlikely to be realized, at least on the terms you anticipate. As someone pointed out, there is a standing order against following illegal orders, and a more important standing order against following stupid orders.
Both forms may be present.
Posted by: Eric | October 18, 2004 07:25 PM
So go to your NCOIC or OIC or their CO, don't get on the cell phone to mama! What a bunch of wimps.
Posted by: Bill | October 19, 2004 11:07 AM
They spent 3 hours communicating with command, and then refused. Thanks for sharing.
Posted by: Eric | October 19, 2004 11:22 AM
I think its horrible to order soliders to drive unarmored, unescorted, deadlined vehicles (even if circle "X" by the COC) filled with unusable materials in such an extremly hositle enviroment. Whomever ordered this "Code Red" should have to justify it to the American Public - because we want the truth, and yes we can handle it.
Posted by: rebekah | October 20, 2004 04:00 AM
I can see what you mean, if they spent the 3 hours trying, well, they did try. I guess that there are times when the system doesn't work. If the intent was to save lives other that their own, more power to them. I'm old school and calling home for assistance when you are on active duty still don't ring right. The chain of command goes all the way up to the CIC.
Posted by: Bill Hedrick | October 20, 2004 05:07 AM
Rebekah,
From a considerable distance, I think the tasking of lower MSR Tampa transport assets (unarmored) to upper MSR Tampa (armor required) is like the assignment of AF reservists (groundcrews) to convoy guntrucks, also on MSR Tampa. It shows a lack of plan, force and material. Retasking a unit to deliver rejected fuel is more problematic of the immediate command. Where more of the COC has an overhang is the assertion that the fuel wasn't previously rejected, a document problem, and that the soldiers who were trained in testing for fuel contamination, erred in claiming the fuel was contaiminated.
Finally, at this point in the war, even in a supported convoy, vehicles that are visibly not armored may be preferred targets, so the possibility that the seven POL transports and crews would join up with something, even an escort, from some waypoint to the endpoint, still isn't that good a rebuttal by command to the reckless endangerment charge by the troops.
Bill,
Reservists have a lower BS tolerence than younger, and less experienced or less worldly first hitchers. Home is the one number that is always on speed-dial on my handsets. The people who answer that number always go above and beyond the call. An Army without families would be a very different Army.
Posted by: Eric | October 20, 2004 06:30 AM
THE FIRST MOS OF ALL MILITARY IS INFANTRY.
EVERYONE GOES THROUGH THE SAME BASIC TRAINING.
IF COMMAND ALLOWS THIS TO GO UNPUNISHED, THEY WILL LOSE CONTROL AND COMMAND, WHICH IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN AN ARMY. AN ARMY WITHOUT CONTROL IS A MOB!
WE HAD NO ARMORED TRUCKS IN VIETNAM?
OUR TROOPS STILL RECEIVED RESUPPLY?
Posted by: GERALD | October 20, 2004 03:00 PM
Everyone gets an opinion.
Researching this I came across a report that the average end-to-end milage for a RVN supply run was about 120 klicks, and the MSR Tampa about 10 times that. The logistics problems are not equivalent, and the opfors didn't have cell phones and lots of cars to work with.
"If command allows this to go unpunished ..." At this point, the jury is still out whether the culpability lies with the orders, or the ordered. If intentional contaimination of helicopter fuel is tolerated, and attempts to prevent the same act punished, why not substandard ammo or armor or intel or ...
Broadly, the point you are making is that the military should have about as much solidarity as caged chickens, the ones who peck each other to death and eat the wounded. I prefer to think that the 343rd are as good men and women, and a real problem existed, which could be solved if everyone kept their cool, including command.
Finally, not everyone's first billet is infantry. It wasn't Dave Guindon's, and it wasn't the first for a lot of men and women now in country.
Illegal orders, and stupid orders, can be followed, but it isn't in the service's interest for either to be followed, ever.
Posted by: Eric | October 20, 2004 04:20 PM
Through all of this, the details are un-important. What is important is this is yet another example of poor command structure. From the PL O-1 to the Commander O-10 there is no clear oversite of whats happening on the ground. Unit commanders giving stupid orders and command staff ignoring and denying.
As far as Armor, these are tacticle vehicles. They were not designed as combat vehicles, most if not all cannot take the additional weight of armor and still perform the mission. This is the 1st conflict where there is any conserted effort to armor tacticle vehicles but only so much can be accomplished. The millge of a run is immaterial, it's where it's headed that makes the difference. As a Viet Nam Vet, Viet Nam was as treacherous if not more than IRAQ.
Posted by: Jim | October 21, 2004 12:04 PM
Jim,
Command error wasn't the presenting problem, and only details can establish what is the actual problem. Your view (and mine) were not the narratives from either CENTCOM or the press, for five days post-event.
There appears to be a design problem with the Hummer. A half-ton of armor is outside the specs for its suspension.
The length of the logistical tail in Iraq is much greater than it was in Viet Nam, and independent of risk that imposes greater cost to deliver the same level of support. Was the risk greater in VN than at present in Iraq? I don't think so. US forces had much more civil and military support in VN for almost a decade than US forces have had in Iraq for less than a year. I don't think the risks are yet "comperable", except over very short time spans, or milage/event statistics, that don't look at the armed reserve of the opposing forces.
Posted by: Eric | October 21, 2004 12:39 PM
Command is the problem. It's Platoon leaders and Company commanders giving the orders and higher echelon doing the song and dance. As far as the HMMWV, you're right, the spec is 1/4 ton. I know of no authorized armor kit that would weigh in at 1/2 ton. The only authorixer hang on is 4 door plates. Don't confuse the SF HMMWV with standard, not the same vehicle.
Posted by: Jim | October 21, 2004 12:53 PM
Sounds like these wimps wants their Mommy. How in the hell do these people get in the Service in the first place, I guess they like Kerry? Where have all the real soliders gone. We need NCO's who can Stand Tall, a leader That knows how to get the job done. NCO, your job is to get the job done and bring all your troops home, think, plan and then act. RJ, US Army Airborne Retired
Posted by: RJ(Airborne) | October 22, 2004 11:50 AM
Everyone gets an opinion.
What the presidential preference of the soldiers in question are is something I wouldn't even guess at.
Posted by: Eric | October 22, 2004 12:03 PM
This group needs to spend a week in the rough with a 12 man A Team if they really want to see what life in combat is all about. I feel everyone NCO should go through Ranger School, this would help them to become better Leaders, think fast, plan fast and get the mission done on time and with no loss of life. A good NCO must be a good leader and in support units we have very few good ones. I better end this, they pissed me off. MSG Randy Ret.
Posted by: Randy | October 22, 2004 12:07 PM
I differ. The point isn't to make some value judgement about combat, it is to avoid getting into combat from the cabs of POL tankers. The point of a helo and gun truck escort is to deter engagement by opfors. The point of servicable vehicles is to avoid getting into limited mobility situations attractive to engagement-capable opfors. The point of armored vehicles is to avoid preferential targeting by engagement-disposed but not yet engagement-committed opfors. The point of going from point A to point B is to move some necessary load, and contaminated fuel has limited uses, few of which are "necessary".
Posted by: Eric | October 22, 2004 12:36 PM
What ever happened to adapt and overcome. I am glad I did not have to serve with cowards such as these. It brings dishonor to ALL who have served and it is unspeakable of what they have done to those who have paid the ultimate price. They were not too concerned about the vehicles while they were claiming their benefits I bet.
Posted by: Don | October 25, 2004 07:41 AM
Everyone gets an opinion.
Overlooking the possibility that the soldiers had better judgement than the brass, or that reservists are on average smarter about the big picture than regulars, just how is abstract morality-based criticism of this unit different from what troops who served in Viet Nam experienced?
Incidently, the only way to "adapt and overcome" the problem of unsupportable logistical exposure is to shorten the logistical tail. It can't be wished away.
Posted by: Eric | October 25, 2004 08:23 AM