March 26, 2003, 1230hrs MSK (GMT +3), Moscow - As of the
morning March 26 fierce battles have resumed in Iraq along
the entire front. As was previously expected the sand storm
has halted the advance of the coalition forces. Additionally,
the coalition troops were in serious need of rest, resupply
and reinforcement.
For much of the day unfavorable weather paralyzed combat
activities of one of the main attack groups of the coalition
- the 101st Airborne Division, which was forced to completely
curtail all of its combat operations. Combat readiness
of this division is of strategic importance to the entire
coalition force primarily due to the fact that the division
operates 290 helicopters of various types, including the
72 Apache attack helicopters. The 101st Airborne Division
along with the 82nd Airborne Division and the 3rd Infantry
Division (Mechanized) forms the backbone of the XVIII Airborne
Corps - the main strike force of the coalition.
In essence, the 101st Airborne Division provides suppression
of the enemy while simultaneously conducting aerial reconnaissance
and suppression of any newly-discovered enemy forces. It
maintain constant contact with the enemy and contains the
enemy until the main forces arrive.
Currently the coalition's main forces are conducting combat
operations along the approaches to the towns of Karabela
and An-Najaf.
During the past 24 hours the coalition units in these
areas sustained 4 killed and up to 10 wounded. All indications
are that one coalition special operations helicopter was
lost and no communication with the helicopter could be
established. The faith of its crew and the troops it carried
is still being investigated. Another two coalition helicopters
made emergency landings in areas controlled by friendly
forces. Aircraft engines were found to be extremely susceptible
to the effects of sand.
As was determined by our [GRU] intelligence even before
the start of combat operations, the primary goal of the
coalition command was an energetic advance across the desert
along the right bank of the Euphrates river, reaching the
central Iraq with a further thrust toward Baghdad through
Karabela. Another strategic attack was to go around Basra
through An-Nasiriya toward Al-Ammara followed by a full
isolation of the southern [Iraqi] forces, effectively splitting
Iraq in half.
The first part of the plan - a march across the desert
toward Karabela - was achieved, albeit with serious delays.
The second part of the plan in essence has failed. Up to
this moment the coalition troops were unable to punch through
the Iraqi defenses near An-Nasiriya and to force the Iraqis
toward Al-Ammara, which would have allowed the coalition
to clear the way to Baghdad along the strategically important
Mesopotamian river valley with Tigris and Euphrates covering
the flanks of the advancing forces. So far only a few coalition
units were able to get to the left bank of the Euphrates,
where they are trying to widen their staging areas.
Additionally, the prolonged fighting near An-Nasiriya
allowed the Iraqis to withdraw most of their forces from
Basra region and to avoid being surrounded.
Currently the coalition forces are trying to get across
the river near An-Najaf and Karabela, where, all indications
are, heavy combat will continue during the next two days.
Harsh criticism from the top US military leadership and
pressure from Washington forced the coalition command to
resort to more energetic actions. In addition to that the
shock of the first days of war among the coalition troops,
when they expected an easy trek across Iraq but encountered
stiff resistance, is now wearing off. They are now being "absorbed" into
the war. Now the coalition actions are becoming more coherent
and adequate. The coalition command is gradually taking
the initiative away from the Iraqis, which is in part due
to the reliance of the Iraqi command on inflexible defensive
tactics.
Now the main tactical move of the US troops is to use
their aerial and ground reconnaissance forces to test the
Iraqi defenses, to open them up and, without entering direct
close combat, to deliver maximum damage using artillery
and ground attack aircraft. The coalition has finally stopped
pointlessly moving around in convoys, as was characteristic
of the first three days of the ground war.
The tactics allowed for increased combat effectiveness
and considerably increased losses of the Iraqi side. Due
to such attacks by the coalition during the previous night
and today's early morning the Iraqis have lost 250 troops
killed and up to 500 wounded. Up to 10 Iraqi tanks were
destroyed and up to three Iraqi artillery batteries were
suppressed.
However, despite the increased combat effectiveness,
the coalition forces have so far failed to capture a single
sizable town in Iraq. Only by the end of the sixth day
the British marine infantry was able to establish tentative
control over the tiny town of Umm Qasr. During the hours
of darkness all movement around the town is stopped and
the occupying troops withdraw to defensive positions. Constant
exchanges of fire take place throughout the town. Out of
more than 1,500-strong local garrison the British managed
to capture only 150 Iraqis. The rest has either withdrew
toward Basra or changed into civilian clothes and resorted
to partisan actions.
Near Basra the British forces in essence are laying a
Middle Ages-style siege of a city with the population of
two million. Artillery fire has destroyed most of the city's
life-supporting infrastructure and artillery is used continuously
against the positions of the defending units. The main
goal of the British is two maintain a strict blockade of
Basra. Their command is confident that the situation in
the city can be destabilized and lack of food, electricity
and water will prompt the local population to cause the
surrender of the defending forces. Analysts point out that
capture of Basra is viewed by the coalition command as
being exceptionally important and as a model for the future "bloodless" takeover
of Baghdad.
So far, however, this approach does not work and the city's
garrison is actively defending its territory. Just during
the past night at least three British soldiers were killed
and eight more were wounded in the exchange of fire [near
Basra].
It is difficult not to not to notice the extremely overstretched
frontline of the coalition. This frontline is stretching
toward Baghdad through An-Najaf and Karabela and its right
flank goes all the way along the Euphrates and is completely
exposed. All main supply and communication lines of the
coalition are going through unprotected desert. Already
the supply routes are stretching for more than 350 kilometers
and are used to deliver 800 tonnes of fuel and up to 1,000
tonnes of ammunition, food and other supplies daily to
the advancing forces.
If the Iraqis deliver a decisive strike at the base of
this front, the coalition will find itself in a very difficult
situation, with its main forces, cutoff from the resupply
units, losing their combat readiness and mobility and falling
an easy pray to the Iraqis.
It is possible that the Americans are relying on the power
of their aviation that should prevent any such developments.
It is also possible that this kind of self confidence may
be very dangerous.
Massive numbers of disabled combat vehicles and other
equipment becomes a strategic problem for the coalition.
Already, radio intercepts indicate, all available repair
units have been deployed to the front. Over 60% of all
available spare parts have been already used and emergency
additional supplies are being requested.
The sand is literally "eating up" the equipment.
Sand has a particularly serious effect on electronics and
transmissions of combat vehicles. Already more than 40
tanks and up to 69 armored personnel carriers have been
disabled due to damaged engines; more than 150 armored
vehicles have lost the use of their heat-seeking targeting
sights and night vision equipment. Fine dust gets into
all openings and clogs up all moving parts.
The coalition command has effectively acknowledged its
defeat in the information war with the strikes against
the television center in Baghdad and now further strikes
should be expected against television and ground satellite
transmitters. The coalition is attempting to leave the
Iraqis without information in order to demoralize them.
The extreme length of the resupply routes and the actions
of the Iraqi reconnaissance units have created a new problem:
the coalition command is forced to admit that it has no
information about the conditions on the roads. Currently,
as intercepted radio communications show, the coalition
command is trying to establish the whereabouts of more
than 500 of its troops that fell behind their units, departed
with resupply convoys or were carrying out individual assignments.
So far it was not possible to establish how many of these
troops are dead, captured or have successfully reached
other units.
(source: iraqwar.ru, 03-26-03, translated by Venik)
