In October 1998 Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MI) and Committee on Foreign Relations chair Jesse Helms (R-NC), part of a group of 15 Senators who vote against all arms control treaties, managed to stage a vote on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and defeat its ratification (Art. II powers not stripped from the Senate by the House in 1871). The group of 15 Cold Warriors was joined by 30 Senators committed to any political defeat they could inflict upon the Clinton Administration, and by several Senators who supported the CNTBT in theory, but voted against ratification for reasons that are simply infantile. Olympia Snowe voted against ratification (3rd group).
Those chickens, particularly the 30 moralists, have been roosting at home ever since, but the Cold Warrior and Infantile chickens came home to roost yesterday at the 7th NPT Review Conference, when the Non-Aligned Movement (116 States), via Egypt, objected to agenda
language that did not refer to the commitments made at the 6th NPT RC, specifically activation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiation of a treaty ending production of bomb material everywhere.
The Bush regime (stolen elections and fraudulent foreign wars) has blocked consensus for an agenda that does revisit the commitments made at the 6th NPT RC, and the Mubarak regime (no elections) has blocked consensus for an agenda that doesn't revisit the commitments made at the 6th NPT RC. Its a North-South standoff where the protagonists are two weakened, lame-duck dictatorships.
At issue are two provisions of the NPT:
The conference president, Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, is frustrated. North Korea has announced its withdrawal from the NPT, which until it tests a weapon is fictive, and India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, might prefer the "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967" clause that defines NWS status to be modified to remove or modify the "prior to" date, as accession to the treaty in NNWS status would require that they first dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclear materials under international safeguards -- a condition South Africa met in its 1991 accession to the NPT. If the NPT is caused to fail, and there is only one government commited to that goal, then disarmament fails. The question isn't "will Iran get the bomb?", as much as the current regime would like to control the terms of discussion. The question is when will Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela become NWS.
An exercise left to the reader is the standard analysis of the strategic and tactictal theater problems of package and target inventories, means of delivery, and integration with chemical, biological, conventional weapons and the combined force structures (or if naval or air alone, those in isolation), for the Islamic Republic and its possible hostilities scenarios, either as the initiating State, or a responding State, in bilateral and multilateral engagement scenarios. Remember, any answer other than a compelling advantage is impossible, otherwise the control the terms of discussion by the current regime would be insane, or intentionally false.
In the extended entry are excerpts from Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi's address to the 7th NPT RC this week.
"Despite the difficulties that the nonproliferation regime has historically faced, we can generally assess that the NPT has been successful in containing the number of nuclear-weapon states.
"On the other hand, the treaty has not been successful in attaining the objective of nuclear disarmament as it has been called for in its Article VI.
"Following the major efforts by states parties to strengthen the treaty, the 2000 NPT Review Conference welcomed enthusiastically 'the unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI.'
"Therefore, we propose that the Conference would establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument, on providing security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty, and to submit the draft of the legal instrument to the next review conference for its consideration and adoption."
Excerpts on the peaceful use of nuclear energy:
"Mr. President, the 'inalienable right' of the states to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes emanates from the universally accepted proposition that scientific and technological achievements are the common heritage of mankind.
"The promotion of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has been, therefore, one of the main pillars of the NPT and the main statutory objective of the IAEA.
"It is unacceptable that 'some' intend to limit the access to peaceful nuclear technology to an exclusive club of technologically advanced states under the pretext of 'nonproliferation.' This attitude is in clear violation of the letter and spirit of the treaty and destroys the fundamental balance which exists between the rights and obligations in the treaty.
"The treaty itself has clearly rejected this attempt in its Article IV by emphasizing that 'nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the treaty to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.'
"Let me make it absolutely clear that arbitrary and self-serving criteria and thresholds regarding proliferation-proof and proliferation-prone technologies and countries can and will only undermine the treaty.
"Iran, for its part, is determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology, including enrichment, exclusively for peaceful purposes and has been eager to offer assurances and guarantees that they remain permanently peaceful."
Excerpts on nonproliferation:
"The IAEA full-scope safeguard system provides the main foundation and basis for preventing the diversion of peaceful nuclear technology to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
"The IAEA has been recognized by the previous NPT Conferences as 'the competent authority to verify and assure compliance with the safeguards agreements' and to consider and investigate concerns regarding noncompliance.
"Nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use are the pillars of the treaty.
"The international community has lent this responsibility to each of us to preserve the integrity of the Treaty and promote its implementation.
"This would be achieved if we take appropriate decisions on:
1. Concrete steps toward ensuring universality of the NPT;
2. Realization of the commitment by nuclear weapons states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states parties to the treaty through concluding a legally binding instrument;
3. Ensure and promote the basic rights of states parties to unhindered access to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination;
4. Reconfirm the undertakings by nuclear weapon states to implement 13 practical steps toward nuclear disarmament.
"Today, the credibility of the NPT is at stake. The treaty faces new challenges which we need to effectively address. However, the fact [is] this treaty – with whatever shortcomings it may have and the deficiencies in its implementation process – provides the only internationally viable foundation for curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and attaining the goal of nuclear disarmament.
"I sincerely hope that the deliberations of this conference could assist us to consolidate the foundations of this treaty in the circumstances that global security, more than ever, requires wise and brave decisions to salvage the credibility of the treaty."
Posted by EBW at May 7, 2005 11:59 AM | TrackBack