February 08, 2005 October is Koufax Pledge Drive month
Flight of the Dodo
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Ironically, researching why the Indian military was preventing MSF from getting aid to the indigenous tribes in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands lead me to the Indian Navy "standing into (future) danger" by visiting the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, as well as the now obvious command path from the ANI command to the missile and weapons technical cadres and the current President of India and control of the sea lanes between historically Arab Mozambique and the Straits of Malacca. That lead me to Pakistan's Gwadar Port project, and the mosaic of compeating interests -- "strategic depth" for the Pakistani Navy (as opposed to being blockaded or destroyed in Karachi Port), the Central Asian road and pipeline, the "All Weather" friendship between Beijing and Islamabad, China's strategic defense program (high-tech, ergo high-energy), and India's "blue water" plan ...
Planners in Beijing, Dehli, Islamabad and Tehran are looking at the same problem, and they are all coming to the same solution space -- sea power, either its projection or its negation, and for three out of the four, the US Indian Ocean Fleet is a ... complication.
Today al-Quida achived a strategic victory. It has sunk seven of the twelve DD(X) built between the years 2005 and 2008, ensuring that should fleets meet in the Indian Ocean, either in the west off the coast of Africa or the Gulf of Oman, or the east off the coast of Indonesia and Australia, the US fleet is less likely to survive the encounter.
Note to US planners. The fish stocks have taken a beating, but there is still a wicked big ocean on either side of the rectangle. Oil is lighter than water, but not light enough so that air transport back to CONUS is cost-effective, and look-down capability really isn't a substitute for surface movement.
Posted by EBW at February 8, 2005 04:41 PM | TrackBackYears ago, back in the late 70s/early 80s, Adm. "Sandy" Woodward (later of Falklands fame) was in command of the Armilla Patrol (UK naval force in the Gulf during Afghanistan and Iran/Iraq war looking after tankers). At the time this force contained 3 Type-12 ASW frigates, one County-class destroyer (the flagship - Counties were sizable ships, although we termed them Guided Missile Destroyers the US would have considered them DLGs rather than DDGs) and a couple of RFAs (a fleet tanker and a stores ship).
A sizable exercise was staged between the UK task group and the US force in the Gulf - a carrier task force centred on Forrestal. Woodward (a submariner originally) came up with a simple countergame strategy - namely, the force dispersed around the CVBG perimeter in the hours before the exercise commenced. Then, they began manoeuvring randomly whilst maintaining EMCON. At nightfall all the ships, auxiliaries included, would head for the estimated position of the carrier at best speed.
They were to give the impression of being merchantmen as far as possible, including wearing as many lights as possible. The problem was that only the flagship (Glamorgan) had any real anti-surface capability beyond a 4.5" turret. As the exercise progressed, Glamorgan approached behind the decoys. When they were finally challenged on radio, an officer aboard Glamorgan imitated an Indian accent and posed as a liner plying between Karachi and Kuwait.
When they reached an estimated range of 20 miles, they lit-off the radars and simulated the launch of 4 Exocets. They then went dark again and headed away. At the estimated impact time a signal was made offering help in the search-and-rescue operation.
Moral - beware narrow seas, heavy traffic, rockets and liars!
Posted by: Alex at February 9, 2005 07:07 AMOh what fun! There was a comment about some of this with the oil implications on Marketplace [Marketplace.org] last night 2/10 on APR. So others are thinking here too...
Posted by: VJ at February 11, 2005 03:00 AM