Wampum

Rocket Science

Note: CENTCOM has settled on the man-pack theory of causation, and states that a human torso and "suicide vest" have been located in situ. The prior theories included indirect fire.

Since the primary function of military information disclosure is war winning, it is possible that the facts offered serve that primary function.

If the in-situ causation theory is correct, there was an estimated liklihood of perimeter breech with an estimated upper bound on cost to valuable US and IIG military combat assets, and an estimated upper bound on vulnerability to attack and damage on major US and IIG military establishments at arbitrary times and places, and an estimated upper bound on the military capability necessary to protect military installations, and the event of the 21st fell within the area bounded by the acceptable risk and cost curves. No secondary explosions, no substantial loss of equipment, and as Michael Py notes on NANOG, in the infantry, the cheapest hardware to replace is personnel.

Sorry. That is the way it is. Defenses are permeable. Costs are calculable. Force protection is constructed within a cost/benefit framework. Even if the civilian leadership we went to war with were what we want them to be.

But what if the in-situ causation theory is incorrect?

In the early evening of Feb ruary 25th, 1991 a Scud was launched at Dhahran. The Scud broke up on reentry showering a United States housing compound with debris, and the warhead hit a warehouse serving as a United States barracks in Aujan compound in the Dhahran suburb of Al Khobar. The explosion and resulting fire killed 28 soldiers from the 475th Quartermaster Group (Petroleum & Water Group, class III transport, HQ Ft. Devens, MA) and injured 100, about half of them seriously.

As I pointed out hurridly yesterday, there were a lot of Scuds of all types in Iraq, and the UNSCOM inspection and destruction program of the 90's only targeted those with nuclear (none), chemical agent (estimated thousands) or biological (none?) payloads. The conventional HE and AP payload inventory was not controlled by inspectors after testing negative for chemical warfare agent (CWA) indications. Scuds are simple to aim and fire, taking about an hour, with a simple radar check on upper atmospheric wind direction and speed, which may be available from the US forces directly in real-time. The launch team isn't the only consumer of wind speed and direction navigational corrections data. Triagnulation from a well-known landmark in the airfield Camp Marez is sited on, from the control tower to the target, and from a well-known landmark proximal to the firing point and the firing point, is standard aiming practice.

But there is another candidate delivery system, the 122mm rocket. There are a lot of these in Iraq. The same UNSCUM remarks apply for HE and AP (canister) payloads. For those of you reading this, follow the link into the past, when the NVA replaced the 5km standoff mobile weapon (120mm morter) with the 11km standoff mobile weapon, the 122mm rocket.

In my mind, both of these alternatives to the in-situ theory of causation are far worse than the in-situ theory. The permiability of the defense, the assets at risk to suicide bombers, these are all "knowns". If a stand-off rocket artillery unit has re-activated, others may follow. There is a lot of ordinance left where it was abandoned, or cached.

If December 21st was the date that the Opfors began using rocket artillery, then it is the day when a new type of weapon entered the war. Absent CBW payloads, these weapons were harmless to the mobile invasion force. Now that the invasion is an occupation, the US and IIG offers their combat assets and military establishments as fixed targets.

If you didn't click on the link and read the NVA stand-off material, the picture above should cause you to rethink that choice. That is a photograph of an effective 122mm rocket firing point. That is all it takes. Some sticks, some string, and a survey kit.

The extended entry has a Q and A featuring SecDef Rumsfeld on April 15th, 2003. I've moused up the question on Scuds and his wicked funny answer.

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The following is simply to assist our .mil readers who goggle for the string. I want this piece to be read as widely as the original and the update. 343rd Quartermaster Company Arrested.

Stuff like this:
xx.xx.xx.xx xx.iraq.centcom.mil wampum.wabanaki.net [22/Dec/2004:10:43:12 -0500] "GET /archives/001263.html HTTP/1.0" 200 29600 "http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&q=SPAWAR+PHONE++IRAQ+COMPANY"

More google bait
133RD Engineer Battalion
xx.xx.xx.xx xx.ngb.army.mil wampum.wabanaki.net [23/Dec/2004:11:19:16 -0500] "GET /archives/001531.html HTTP/1.0" 200 8045 "http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=133RD+Engineer+Battalion&btnG=Google+Search

Q: Mr. Secretary, how confident are you that Iraq still has Scud missiles?
And during your evaluation of the battle damage assessments of your bombing
in the western part of Iraq, have you found any sort of evidence there?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Not to my knowledge.

Q: None at all? Not even like shells or anything like that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Mocking) "Please? A little?" (Laughter.) A half of one, is
that what you want?

Q: (Off mike) -- transporter-erector-launchers or anything like that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Look -- look, there are still people shooting and getting
killed in that country. The western area where the Scud baskets were is
enormous! It's enormous! And people are -- there's a handful of people out
there -- Americans. I mean, there are just not large numbers of special
operators out there. They went out there, they went to the Scud baskets,
they were successful in dealing with the people that were out there doing
things. And now we're in a stage where, as the fighting starts to end and
die down, there will be opportunities for individuals to then look around
and see what they find.

Posted by EBW at December 22, 2004 10:55 AM | TrackBack